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THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN FUTURE WARFARE
A lecture delivered by

Rear Admiral Charles R. Brown, USN
at the Naval War College
February 15, 1949

The title of my talk today is the role of the Navy in future

warfare. In such a discussion my inclination is to immediately

thrust myself into the future since the history of the past, however

glorious, is of little but academic interest to us unless it has definite

application in the future.

However, I find it impossible to proceed without first ex

plaining my concept of the functions and purposes of a navy and
this, in turn, inevitably leads me into a brie:f review of the past.

So, if you will forgive me, l will broaden my subject to include the

role of the Navy, or more properly expressed, the role of sea power
in the past, present and future. For sea power has never meant

simply navies alone. It has always meant the sum total of all
weapons, installations, and geographical and other circumstances

-all factors which enable a nation to control and exploit the sea

during war time. One of the most important elements of sea power

is shipping, in which is still carried (and for an indefinite time to

come will continue to be carried) most of the men and commodities
that move across the sea. It would be just as unreasoning to con

sider sea power in te�ms of warships alone, as it would be to con
sider railroad trains in terms solely of locomotives.

A locomotive

represents power-true enough-but, without cars attached, it is
power with no functional meaning. And, without shipping naval ef�

forts are equally negative. We may keep the enemy from using the
sea, but that does not enable us to use the sea for ourselves.

Admiral Brown is Chief of Staff to the President of the Naval War
College.
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The history of most great wars is rich with examples of

shippings' contribution to the war effort. Most of the materials that

went into the British aircraft that hurled back the luftwaffe in the
Battle of Britain of 1940 were brought to the scene of operation

by ship.

soldiers,

Without shipping, not all of the guns, and tanks, and

and airplanes

in the world could have saved Britain. And

the same applies to the later bomber offensive against Germany.

Most of the men, and the food they ate, and the fuel and bombs

needed to mount that offensive, came across on a bridge of ships.
Russian might was kept in the war by the food and munitions we

sent across the sea. And Japan was defeated by the great American

advance that was literally floated across the vast reaches of the
Pacific.

We think of Germany's role in the last war as that of a land

power only.

But even she leaned heavily on her shipping.

She

needed it in the Baltic and the North Sea for support of her Russian

operations and for maintenance of her vital communications with
Scandinavia.

She used it coastwise between Germany, the Low

Countries, and France to relieve a heavily overburdened rail and

highway system. And while Italy remained in the fight and an

active front existed across the Mediterranean, shipping was an in- ·

dispensable means not only of handling Italian coastwise transporta

tion, but of maintaining military communications with the Axis

armies in North Africa.

And I might add parenthetically, the

Allied offensive against that shipping was the determining element
in forcing Rommel's retreat.

But nowhere was the need of shipping so compelling as it

was with Japan. It is curious that, upon the entrance of the United
States and Japan into war, the daily press made full comparison

of their relative naval strength, but forgot to note that Japan had

never more than nine million tons of shipping with which to carry on

commerce and military enterprises over a vast maritime area. It

2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss4/2

2

Brown: The Role of the Navy in Future Warfare

RESTRICTED
was never enough and, with increasing losses to our submarines, air
craft and other weapons, her national economy rapidly deteriorated
and then collapsed.
The ugly little tramp steamer thus occupies an important
quarter of the shield of naval power. It is less splendid than the
great aircraft carrier but no less vital. Both are ships and, to all
the embattled nations of the last war, there was nothing quite so
valuable as a ship. And it will continue to be so in the future. It

is a fundamental law of Physics. That is, you can build a huge tub
-call it a hull if you will-and float it on the surface of the water.
It floats by itself, mind you; it requires no power to keep it afloat.

You can fill it up with goods, or guns, or airplanes, or soldiers,
and with relatively little power you can move it cheaply to any

point you wish. There are no rails or roadbeds to worry about, no
mountains to cross, no tunnels to dig. It is by far the cheapest and

easiest means of transportation known to man. And the more our
civilization advances the 'more we will come to use this cheap and
easy road of the sea for all of our bulk transportation.

We are all familiar with the role of the naval airplane in the
last war. It was used for search, observation and reconnaissance
in,every phase, and so distinguished an officer as Admiral Spruance
has expressed the opinion that photographic reconnaissance alone
provided us with a wealth of vital material which could never have
been hoped for in the past and without which countless lives might
have been unnecessarily expended. The airplane also proved an in
valuable weapon in anti-submarine warfare, both in its own right
and as a closely articulated member of air-surface hunter-killer
teams. But it was with the aircraft carrier that �he naval airplane
achieved its most dramatic successes, for the part played by our
carriers was dominant and indispensable. They assured us a con
centration of air strength possessed of extreme mobility, range and
endurance. They spearheaded and supported our amphibious ad-
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vance at every long step in the Pacific.

The immense distances

and widely scattered defenses offered great opportunity for the em

ployment of these mobile forces which struck at great range and left
all but selected targets by-passed and isolated. In a war in which
command of the air was essential, they never failed to gain that
command at the required time and place. In a naval war, they
destroyed the enemy fleet and annihilated the air power of that

fleet. In an amphibious war, they excelled in the direct support
of troops. And all of these things, combined with the mobility

and long sea-keeping ability of the American Fleet, gave their at

tack a feature of continuous initiative and surprise revolutionary in
the progress of warfare.

Furthermore, we have now crossed a threshold.

Using

atomic bombs and other new weapons of science, the flexibility and
destructiveness of the carrier airplane has been increased many fold.

And the Navy, no longer shackled by the historic barriers of the

shoreline, can now strike telling blows deep in enemy territory. For,

with no intention of detracting from the land-based airplane but in

simple justice to its carrier-based sister, it must be recognized that
the aircraft carrier task force provides the only truly mobile air force
in the world. Not only the aircraft themselves, but their fields are
capable of rapid movement. It is therefore, a force with all of the

peculiar advantages of mobility such as the ability to concentrate

and the ability to achieve surprise while the land-based enemy

struggles to redeploy aircraft scattered over hundreds of fixed
fields which may be separated by thousands of miles. Redeploy

ment of aircraft to meet such threats is next to impossible, so the
blow must be absorbed by local defense forces. To be effective

the enemy must be strong everywhere, a most difficult thing to
achieve.

To state it in another way, the aircraft carrier may be said
to gather up and coordinate all the principles of war and employ
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them with prime emphasis on the principles of mass, movement
and surprise.
The carrier's compact, self-sufficient organization gives con
ditions very difficult to obtain ashore, particularly in advanced
theaters. The aircraft receive excellent upkeep and repair, and the
air crews live in surroundings which enhance efficiency and morale.
Air operations are served by a highly compact intelligence and com
munication organization which permits up-to-the-minute briefing
prior to take-off and precise control in the air. Cruising in enemy
waters, the task force is protected by its fighter patrols, a certain
number of which may be airborne during daylight periods, and by
its night fighters during darkness. These fighters are directed to
their interceptions by highly trained personnel using excellent radar
equipment. Radar picket vessels and airborne early warning sets
extend the effective range of this radar many miles beyond the
task force. Such enemy aircraft as can penetrate this fighter plane
defense are met over the task group by a truly tremendous concen
tration of anti-aircraft fire which, directed by radar, denies the
enemy planes the advantages of cloud cover and darkness. The
heavi�r shells, of course, are influence fused and explode when
passing within lethal range of an aircraft. An average fast carrier
task group of the last war had a concentration of over 1600 guns
to use in its defense. When translated into fire-power, gentlemen,
that means over 6,000 bullets per second or just under 200 tons of
steel every minute. This, in its ability to deliver hot metal, sur
passes any conceivable concentration of artillery ashore. It was
positively brutal and it is small wonder that even those Japs who
were not suicidally inclined grew to consider an anti-carrier
mission as almost automatic enrollment in the Kamikaze Corps.
· Before leaving the carrier, I would like to point out that
the carrier-based airplane is not and should not be considered as
a rival of the land-based airplane. The two are capable of a bril-
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liant partnership which can multiply rather than add to the over
all effectiveness of our effort. For in war, as in any organic phen
omenon, the whole is infinitely more than the mechanical sum of its
parts. Land-air power can and does operate over the seas and
not only should this be recognized, but it should be welcomed and
utilized to the fullest. By the same token it should be equally ap

parent and gratifying that sea-air power can operate over the land
with equal facility and effectiveness. The defenses of the enemy
can be spread thin by the more varied direction of sea-air power's

attack making easier the more inflexible approach of land-air
power. On the other hand, land-air power, by the crushing weight

of its sustained offensive, can aid and abet these rapier-like thrusts
of sea-air power. There is no duplication unless it is the duplica
tion of the "one-two" punch.

New weapons have had a profound effect upon the thinking of

us all. The blinding fury of atomic warfare unhappily represents
man's most significant conquest since the discovery of fire.

The

historic balance between offense .and defense has been utterly

destroyed.

To deny the impact of this on naval thinking would be

downright folly.

Indeed it would be courting disaster.

Every new weapon is a challenge to sea power; a challenge

to recognize it, utilize it, and defend itself against it-:-or perish.

Even those new weapons of the last war enormously complicated

our problems.

They opened new avenues to us, closed others, and

in many cases circumscribed the profitable employment of the Navy.
Today, we have atomic fission.

Tomorrow (when it comes and it

will come) we will have the ultra-long range guided missile with an

atomic head. We must, all of us-ground, sea and air-learn how
to utilize these weapons and how to defend ourselves against them.

Victory or defeat, when and if we must fight again, will hinge

upon the degree of our success in doing this.
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By the same token we must never permit our enthusiasm for
the new to cause us to prematurely discard the old. Certainly,
we must cast away garments which are moth-eaten. But we must
avoid swapping a serviceable coat for a new one that does not fit.
Our job is to sharpshoot; setting our sights neither too high nor too
low. We must come forth with , the most nearly correct answer
obtainable. We are no longer blessed with unlimited resources, and
we must be certain that those we have are divided in the most ef

fective manner.

In remembering that the war of tomorrow is to be fought
with new weapons, we must not forget that so was the war of yes
terday and the day before that. T�e unresting progress of mankind

causes continual changes in weapons.

Drastic change has been so

persistent during the last one hundred years that (if I might be

permitted to coin a phrase) change may be said to have become one
of the constants of strategy;
And a review of the past will warn us against the dangers

of being too quick to discard as well as too slow to adopt.

For

example, the opinions expressed between the last two wars on the

role of air in sea operations were too often founded on theory
motivated by personal prejudice.

And to a large degree the ut

terances of both visionary and reactionary were ultimately proved

false. Those who planned on naval engagements after the fashion
of Jutland and Trafalgar were bitterly disappointed.

Those who

scoffed at the menace of the airplane saw their dreams go up in the
black, greasy smoke at Pearl Harbor.

But those who proceeded,

because of the startling successes of submarines and aircraft, to

paint with reckless brush pictures of war taking place wholly in the

air or wholly under seas were found to be equally wide of the mark.

False proclamations were issued that navies were obsolete, that the

heavy bomber would interdict all sea lanes, that no ship could op-

7
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949

7

Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 4, Art. 2

RESTRICTED
erate within reach of land-based airplanes, and so on; · predictions
which were not borne out by the experience of any warring nation.
Technology marches on a broad f�ont. Its progress is not
confined to those few implements whi�h, today, seemed favored of
the gods. Those impiements which, today, seem threatened with
extinction may sometimes use the same technology to develop to
morrow new means of offensive usage, thus furthering their in

trinsic merit, and new means of defending themselves, thus contin
uing their useful life. What we will then have will not be a retul'.n
. to the conditions of yesterday, but something new and distinctive.
It is a great misfortune that a discussion such as this can

seldom be indulged in without creating bitterness which generates
resistance and, in the end, delays progress. The simple fact is

that change must occur. To ignore it is disastrous. But revolutions
are seldom as complete as revolutionaries hope, and the wise man
must travel the unpopular and little publicized middle road, being
neither lulled by the wishful thinking of black reactionaries, nor
swept away by the rantings of wild-eyed enthusiasts.
But enough of the present.

Let us look into the future.
And as we look into that future we see many factors affecting the
employment of navies. But during the foreseeable future it is
equally clear that there will continue to be a place for navies

both their surface and air components. Indeed, so long as there
are oceans there will be ships. No serious student of sea power
(and these students are by no means confined to the naval pro

fession) has yet to suggest that sea power is on the way out. It
was no "happenstance" that the greatest of all air wars and the one
which saw the most titanic land battles of all times was also the
greatest of all sea wars. World War II saw sea power reach its
heights in its influence on history; not alone in the magnitude of
operations, but in the degree to which those operations contributed
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to final victory. And, in any great war in the future, sea power is
still as certain to be decisive as it formerly has been. Indeed, the

greatly increased quantity and complexity of equipment to be used
in future wars makes sea power even more important than ever
before.

Just as an army is useful in land warfare, for those who

propose to fight across the seas, a navy is a necessary possession.

In the hands of an intelligent and understanding high command it is
an invaluable weapon. And I might add this:

Sea power is the friend, ally and indeed the proud servant of

air power.

For, with the aid of land power, it can seize, develop

and support overseas air bases close to an enemy, thereby multi

plying the effectiveness of air power by many, many fold, For if we

cut the distance a bomber must fly in half we multiply its eff �ctive

ness by four. If we cut the distance down to one fourth, we mul

tiply its effectiveness by sixteen.

In other words, given the same

size air force, we will have sixteen times as many bombers to fight
a war at this range (indicating) as we would have if we were
forced to fight out at this range (indicating).

This old law of mathematics applies to all weapons from the

bow and arrow to the guided missile.

The day of the long range

guided missile is still many years in the future but, when it comes,
navies will still be needed to take it closer to the enemy.

weapons are enormously expensive.

Modern

This is true whether we are

speaking of a jet bomber costing several million dollars or an atomic

bomb the cost of which is a measurable percentage of our national

effort.

We must not waste them trying to hit a target thousands

of miles away when we have the means of getting much closer.

So much for the foreseeable future and, for that matter, the

predictable future which lies just beyond that.

But what of the

speculative future-the "wide· blue yonder", the day of the ultra-
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long range guided missile with an atomic head-what about sea
power then?
First, let us examine the most accepted version of warfare
in the atomic age. It seems universally conceded that, with our
present type of government, we must accept, not deliver the first
blow. I decline to subscribe to this gloomy view but, however you

view it, such warfare is not attractive. Cities will be vast catas
trophe areas, and the normal channels of communications and
transportation will be in unutterable confusion. Even the smaller
towns and the rural areas, though perhaps not struck directly, will
be in varying degrees of confusion and disorganization due to the
collapse of the metropolitan centers with which their economies are

intertwined.

Of course, a great deal can be done in the way of passive de

fense, such as going underground and decentralizing and reorgan

izing vital industries and services, and adopting other methods to
avoid complete paralysis of the nation. But the idea that a nation,

after weeks of atomic warfare, could achieve a fraction of the pro
duction of America, during World War II simply does not make
sense. The atomic war must be fought largely with stockpiles of
arms in their finished state. Stockpiles of raw materials may be
practically valueless; just as useless as that huge pile of gold we

kept buried in the ground throughout World War II. And incident
ally, let us not forget that gold too was once an essential sinew of
war, and it is most doubtful that our forefathers ever foresaw the
day when it would not be.
Thus it can be seen that our ability to strike back after an
atomic attack will depend upon the degree to which our armed
forces ·have made themselves independent of the urban communities
and their industries for supply and support. In the past our mili
tary establishments have simply been cadres which underwent
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enormous but slow expansion after the outbreak of war. Such ex
pansion cannot take place after an atomic attack. , The idea that
must be hammered home above all else is that practically the only
forces which will be able to fight after an atomic attack will con
sist of those already in uniform using the arms and equipment
already in the arsenals. And those arsenals must be in caves in the
wilderness or otherwise suitably dispersed, hidden, and protected.
It has been suggested (and the suggestion seems sound)
that the forces which will fight in an atomic war should be divided
into three elements. The first will be the "Retaliatory Force",
which will return the bombardment with our own atomic weapons.
This force must remain in sharp isolation from the national com
munity. Its functions must not be compromised in the slightest by
the demands for relief from the stricken areas. The "Retaliatory
Force" must either be a highly mobile sea force or one which has
been scattered over a large number of dispersed reservations. Pos
sibly it wiH be a combination of these two, but if a portion of the
"Retaliatory Force" is to occupy reservations, each reservation must
be of a considerable area to permit atomic explosives and their
carriers to be secreted and protected as much as possible by under
ground storage. The entire "Retaliatory Force" must have a com
pletely independent system of inter-communications, since the
supreme command may have been eliminated or its communications
disrupted almost immediately.
The second force will be known as the "Defensive Force". Its
mission will be to resist invasion, to defend against the bombard
ment of atomic missiles by whatever scentific means that have
been developed, to organize the relief of the stricken areas, and to
administer the interior along as nearly constitutional lines as pos
sible. Here, if anywhere, is the place for the citizen army. But it
must be admirably trained and capable of at least local mobilization.
There will be no time for training and nation-wide mobilization once
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atomic warfare starts. Perhaps the old ideal of the minute man with
his musket over the fireplace will be resurrected in suitably modern
ized form. In any event, adequate provisions will have to be made
for local mobilization, for maximum clecentralization of arms and
supply depots, and also for decentralization of tactical authority.
Strategical rather than tactical concentration will be necessary to
avoid high spatial density of military fQrces. And it must be again
emphasized that the arms, supplies and implements of transporta
tion to be depended upon will be those stockpiled in as secure a
ma11:ner as possible.
One more word about the Defensive Force, there is a popular
school of thought today that atomic war necessitates emphasis on
pure defense and the expenditure of vast sums on defense alone. I
cannot go along with this despite the hypothetical proofs advanced.
History is too replete with instances of the "Maginot Line" theories
that have fallen before a dynamic and well conceived offense. I do
not mean to say our defensive forces will. be unimportant, but no
aggressor nation will be discouraged from attacking us because of
the excellence of our defenses alone. She will be far more deterred
by visible evidence that we have the offensive potential to deal her
decisive blows.
And it is therefore to the operations of the third force
known as the "Offensive Force" to which your most thoughtful at
tention is invited. The outcome of the war, the decision as to who
is victor and who is vanquished (a sorry distinction at best in
times of atomic warfare) will depend upon the strategic. situation
existing after about the first sixty days of war. I know of only two
factors influencing the strategic situation after the first sixty days
of atomic war. One is morale, always a gambler's choice when
dealing with the speculative future. Building up a national morale
of such toughness and resiliency that it can withstand the shock of
this type of warfare is a matter of supreme importance to the mili-
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tary thinker, but it is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
mention it now simply to indicate my recognition of the problem.

I

But let us return to the remaining factor influencing the

strategic situation after the first sixty days of atomic warfare. This
factor will be based upon the degree of success of the "Offensive

Force". Remember the "Retaliatory Force" is engaged in bringing

the enemy down to our own level. The "Defensive Force" is avoid
ing titter chaos. If the "Offensive Force" can seize and rapidly de
velop a section of enemy territory which dominates the enemy's

vital areas then that force will be in a position to continue the
initial retaliatory bombardment on a far more effective scale. Not

only that but it will relieve pressure on the homeland, since much
of the enemy's resources must be directed against the captured
area. Thus we draw double on our money since the effectiveness

of our own bombardment is increased while the effectiveness of the
enemy's bombardment is decreased.
Obviously, the' "Offensive Force" must be completely pro

. fessional and trained to the utmost degree.

The target to be

seized must be of a considerable area but, since the forces available
will be limited, it must also be one which can be fairly easily con
quered and even more easily defended from reconquest.

And it

should be repeated that it must be one that dominates the enemy's
vital areas.
Extreme swiftness of invasion will be of inestimable value.
This makes the employment of air power most inviting and un

questionably it will be utilized to the· limit. But the invasion,
occupation, development and support of a considerable area solely

or even chiefly · by air would be an incredibly difficult task, even

if we assume a minimum of air opposition. The task of the of
fensive force is obviously one tailored to sea power. But it must
be a sea power geared to atomic warfare. Its organization, logis-
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tics and tactics must conform to the requirements of atomic war
fare. Ordinary harbors and ports as we know them will be use
less. Supplies, replacements and spare parts must be loaded over
the beaches from dispersed, hidden and protected arsenals. All

ships must be kept adequately dispersed at all time�even prior
to· the outbreak of hostilities. The invasion force itself must be
already embarked, or at least capable of swift embarkation from

hundreds of isolated points for, almost immediately, all ships must
be ready to .proceed to predetermined rendezvous and from thence

to the chosen objective, where a swift invasion will be undertaken
·,\ utilizing surprise to the utmost. It will be an herculean task, in

\rolving not only the seizure of territory but its development with
·�credible rapidity into launching sites suitably separated and ade
q��teiy supplied.
There briefly sketched, is one version of warfare in the

atomic age. As mentioned at the beginning, it is not a pretty pic
ture. It is unnecessary to say that we all most fervently hope the

world will be spared this Armageddon. But in the calamitous
event that it cannot, our job as always will be to win the war. We
must realize. that a reasonable state of readiness by past· standards

may invite disastrous defeat in the future. During the transitional
years that lie ahead of us, our thinking and our planning must re

main broad and flexible to insure that we achieve a maximum state
of readiness at all times.

Perhaps most of you will feel that I have painted a much
too gloomy picture of the future. Well, I agree. I have my per
sonal doubts that atomic warfare, horrible as it may be, will ever
reach the cataclysmic proportions I have outlined. But a good
planner must plan for the worst and hope for the best, and I have
simply chosen the worst situation so that we might examine the
role of sea power under such conditions. Actually, as I have said,
I question the ability of even the atomic bomb to so completely
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destroy such vast areas as our land presents. Further than that, I

refuse to subscribe to a doctrine of despair. I decline to accept it
as our inescapable fate that we must suffer the full measure of

destructiveness this terrible weapon does possess. I heartily sub
scribe to the homely old saying that: "There ain't no holt what can't
be broke." Science presented us with atomic warfare. Science must
provide defenses against it.

She may not, indeed probably

cannot find a complete answer, but she

must

give us something

which will offer humanity a more reasonable chance of survival

than the measures that I, as an unscientific student of warfare,
have been able to outline today.

But, whatever the specific changes indicated by atomic war
fare, this much is clear. Our military leaders must bestir- them

selves to a wholly unprecedented degree in revising military con
cepts inherited from the past.

They must be prepared to dismiss

as possibly irrevelant lessons learned the hard way in the last war.

This will not be easy. It would be much easier if we had lost the
war, or had our leadership been stupid, blundering or marked by

unnecessary delay in adjustment. But such a judgment is not cor
rect in spite of the malicious slander of lesser men.

I do not con�

tend that no mistakes were made. But, on the whole, our leader

ship was unquestionably brilliant and remarkable in its flexibility.
Our ground forces proved to be masters of mechanized and amphib

ious warfare, our navy was not found wedded to the battle-line,

crossing-the-"T" type of warfare (and don't let anyone ever tell

""

you that, no matter who he may be-no navy ever handled air

power more intelligently or effectively) and our air force, though

sincerely wedded to the theory of pure air power, rendered timely

and invaluable close air support to the sister services.

The problems we face today have grown too great to be

solved by the "specialized" thinking of the pa1;1t.

The crying need
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today is for large numbers of military thinkers who collectively

will represent a "super" Clausewitz or a "super" Mahan-brilliant

strategists, not of land power, not of sea power, and not of air

power, but able broad-gauged individuals who can view the whole

picture of

military strategy and come forth with

well-reasoned and

dispassionate answers to the warfare of the future. I am not speak
ing of a super general staff, but of the leaders within the several

services.

Perhaps such paragons can be found just as great needs

in the past gave us an Abraham Lincoln or a George Washington.

But they will not come unless the irresistable urge is built up to find
them, to know whom we seek.

This means that those of us of the

military cloth must cease our "compartmentalized" thinking.

We

must realize that we are not, per se, army officers, naval officers, or
air force officers.

We are

military

officers (and by God we are

Americans too!) and we must, each of us according to our several

talents, strive to see the broad picture without personal or service
bias.
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